Everything Changed On March 7, 2003
Thank you, Kevin Drum. Thank you for citing the single most devastating indictment of the Deserter's rush to war. Thank you for reminding everyone that the "intelligence failure" rationalization is a scam, a diversion, an irrelevancy. Goldstein has been waiting for this for some time.
Kevin reminds us that it didn't matter what the intelligence said prior to March 7, 2003. It didn't matter what we thought we knew about Iraqi WMD, because on March 7, 2003 we learned that all of our intelligence regarding Iraqi WMD was dubious at best, fraudulent at worst. Goldstein has been harping on this for months.
On March 7, 2003 Hans Blix, the head U.N. weapons inspector, reported to the United Nations that that UNSCOM inspectors, provided with full and unimpeded access to all suspected Iraqi WMD sites, conducting unannounced inspections and armed with intelligence from the CIA indicating where these alleged arms could be found, reported that no WMDs had been found - none at all. CIA director George Tenet testified to Congress before the war that the CIA had provided the best U.S. intelligence to UNSCOM on over 100 sites where U.S. intelligence indicated WMDs may be found, including approximately 20 different sites the CIA referred to as "high probability" sites. UNSCOM searched these sites for WMDs, and as of March 7, 2003 UNSCOM had determined that not one of these sites contained WMDS or any evidence of WMDs.One has to wonder why the Dems aren't screaming this at the top of their lungs everyday. It simply didn't matter what the CIA had told the Deserter. It didn't matter what the rest of the world's intelligence agencies thought. On March 7, 2003 we were informed by Hans Blix that our best intelligence on Iraqi WMD was way off target.
[A]s of March 7, 2003 any prior assessment of the likely existence of Iraqi WMD caches or the reliability of U.S. intelligence regarding WMDs had to be radically revised. It was incumbent upon anyone who previously had been certain that Iraq had WMDs to honestly revisit that assessment, and desist from starting a war until that assessment had accounted for the vast gulf between the UNSCOM findings and U.S. intelligence. But the President didn't do this...He accelerated our rush to war and invaded Iraq just 12 days later, even though he knew that he didn't know what he thought he'd known.
Twelve days later we started bombing Baghdad.
Will someone please explain to me why the Deserter and his neocon-men should not be prosecuted for war crimes?
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